Notes � Hegel, critique of Kant

Hegel�s main critique of Kant works on the levels of both metaphysics and epistemology. Kant�s view as termed by Hegel, is that of �psychological� or �subjective� idealism, seeing the world only from the Cartesian first person. Kant is missing or fails to relaise the importance of the dialectic, or speculation, in his theory of mind. By emphasising only the understanding, Kant can only see the opposites in the world: subject-object; mind-body; category-intuition; universal-particular. With speculation, these opposing dualities resolve into a happy triplicity. In fact, Hegel sees a seed of this in the triadic Kantian categories.

Without dialectic, Kant�s reason can only produce the imaginary; reason for Kant is just the understanding considered in abstraction from its only legitimate subject matter (FK 80, W ii 317).

An adverse result of the vacuousness of reason is that Kant is never able to give his ethics a content. The Categorical Imperative serves only to highlight inconsistencies between maxims, and not to tell us what we ought to do.

Hegel thinks there is an underlying inconsistency in Kant�s thought resulting from the different purposes to which Kant applies �reason�. In the Critique of Pure Reason, it is restricted in what it can know to the empirical, while in the Critique of Practical Reason, it needs to be free and unbounded for us to act as moral agents. Kant claims that persons are phenomenally determined yet nuomenally free. It is only by adopting what Hegel regards as a two-worlds ontology that Kant avoids the conflict, but thereby makes freedom and necessity �absolutely heterogenous� (FK 84). This �antithesis between freedom and nature exists because nature operates in accordance with natural necessity, while the rational subject is free� (Priest).

Hegel believes that although Kant was right to reject the soul, since Hegel believes mind-body dualism to be false, Kant�s mistake was to introduce the noumenal self as a further barrier to Geist�s rational self-knowledge.

Kant apparently also has the wrong end of the stick about God.

Hegel actually took his term, the �middle�, from Kant�s Critique of Judgement. Hegel sees the relation between the manifold and unity of understanding as dialectical, �in that both makes the other possible and each �determines� the other: that is, each in very different ways makes the other what it is� (Priest).

The application of the categories to the contents of experience subsumes particulars under universals. This is dualistic because the objects of experience that result must be described using general terms (sortals) and particular terms (definite descriptions, proper names).

Lesser logic

A major source of contention lies between the Kantian and Hegelian use of the term, �categories�. Kant allowed for a complex relation and interdependence between them, for example �the categories of causation and substance are each essential to our empirical concept of a physical object� (Priest). On the other hand, Hegel saw the relationship between them as being dialectical, and emphasises their triadic nature, asserting that in each set of three the third provided a synthesis of the first two (Science of Logic).

Hegel thinks that knowledge as Kant sets it out is not knowledge at all, not �truths�, but only �phenomena�, the world as it appears to us rather than as it is. The �only objectivity Kant allows is provided by the categories, but that these in turn are subjective because �psychological�� (Priest).

�Thought must investigate its own capacity for knowledge� (LL 67 z). The pre-Kantians failed to examine their presuppositions, and so were not �free thinkers�. The categories must be examined, which Kant attempts prior to or independently of their exercise. Rather, Hegel holds that their limitations will be revealed in their use, a much more pragmatic theory of knowledge. This revision and enrichment in use is what Hegel terms the �dialectic�, acculumating truth by reflecting on the inadequacy of concepts in their use.

�The theoretical faculty� (LL 68)

The conditions for experience according to Kant are:

The �transcendental unity of self-consciousness�

This is Kant�s means of identifying �I�, as having the condition of a set of experiences being episodes in the self-same consciousness that is �mine�. Hegel seems to reify this misleadingly as the Ego, despite Kant�s refusal to make any �ontological commitments

�Space and time�

Space and time are the way or manner in which persons perceive, the �universal type of perception�. However, they are a priori, since they are not derived or abstracted from experience so much as they contribute to and shape it.

The �manifold of sensation�

Hegel defines an object �x� in terms of how it can be differentiated from all that is not-x. This is what he means by things having their �being outside themselves�. This is contrasted with the Ego, which has no non-Ego or other-Ego, and so constitutes the undifferentiated �primary identity�, or Geist.

Because Kant defines �I� psychologistically as being just the �transcendental unity of self-consciousness� instead of Geist, he �irretrievably divorces his metaphysics from Hegelian absolute knowledge.

The second reason why Kant�s system can never yield Absolute Knowing is related to the categories. He rejects Kant�s claim that the categories are empty when considered in abstraction from their empirical applications. Hegel argues that they have content even though it is undetectable in sense experience, since they can be discriminated between semantically, that is to say, non-empirically (Priest). However, Hegel allows that the categories could be seen as empty in a Hegelian sense, insofar as the Absolute is not given in perception so understanding by means of the categories cannot be of the things-in-themselves.

Hegel�s use of �categories� is different from Kant�s in three major ways:

There are many more than twelve

They are changing and developing, rather than ahistorically fixed

They apply directly to reality. They cannot be said to apply to things-in-themselves, because Hegel rejects the entire distinction between the worlds of appearances and in-itself on two grounds: incoherence and a psychological construct. He regards the idea of things-in-themselves as defined only by their existence as incoherent, since there is no sortal by which they can be described, i.e. no not-x against which they can be contrasted and thus defined. The in-itself is also a psychological construct insofar as it is a reality as shaped by us, by our concepts and categories. Hegel is ambiguous as to whether there are no things-in-themselves or whether there are things-in-themselves but we can have knowledge of them.

Although �Kant was the first definitely to signalise the distinction between reason and understanding� (LL 73 z), his �drastic underestimation of reason is partly due to an impoverished concept of infinity� (Priest). Kant considers infinity as contrasted with finitude, whereas Hegel sees true infinity as the synthesis of finitude and infinite, that is the whole. This whole is the �universal divine Idea�, the ground of the finite objects, and for and on which human subjects are finite points of view. This is Absolute, rather than subjective, idealism. To Hegel, there is no world as it appears-to-us and world as it is in-itself, but rather a whole of which both subjects and objects are manifestations.

This is why Hegel agrees with Kant�s disassembly of the �soul-thing� into the formal �I� as simply the �unity of self-consciousness�, though he doesn�t see this as a significant advance over Hume. Hegel�s own understanding of the self-conscious subject is as �reality�s points of view on itself� (Priest), as aspects of Geist�s consciousness.

what antinomies are � The Antinomies are lauded insofar as they consider contradictions, but attacked for their limited employment. Hegel considers there to be far more than just four � indeed, �Antinomies appear in all objects of every kind, in all conceptions, notions and ideas� (LL 78). Indeed, �the world� (LL 77, der Welt) is itself paradoxical � it contains contradictions. �Contradictions� in this sense should not be taken in the sense of p and not-p, but as antithetical notions such as freedom and necessity, or subject and object.

�Practical reason� (LL 86)

Hegel attacks the Categorical Imperative as being an entirely formal principle of universalisation, and thus empty, since it can be satisfied by actions that would be consistent if everyone were to adopt them as their maxim, without their necessarily being good. Being �good� is defined vacuously in terms of duty, and so Kant�s ethics do not on their own tell us in any way how we ought to act.

�The reflective power of judgement� (LL 88)

Hegel identifies �reflecting judgement� with �intuitive understanding� in Kant�s system. This is the faculty by which �the particulars [are] � moulded and formed by the universal itself� (LL 88). Hegel sees this as a close anticipation of the Idea. �In exhibiting the reciprocal dependence of universal and particular, Kant�s philosophy shows itself capable of being genuinely speculative (LL 88).

Apparently, Kant would have asked himself the question �What is the final end of the whole�, had he thought through his teleology. The answer is �the Good�, requiring God for its realisation. This realisation is the Idea�s dialectical progress through history. While �Hegel�s God postulates the existence of God for the realisation of his cosmic ideals�, in contrast, Kant �postulates the existence of God for the realisation of human ethical goals� (Priest).

Reading � Walsh, �Kant as seen by Hegel� in Priest (ed), chapter 12,

Hegel was remarkable in his especially close study and analysis of Kant. But he did not agree with it. He rejected Kant�s denial of the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge, and indeed the self-conscious search for truth (i.e. knowledge of reality) of the Geist is crucial to Hegel. Moreover, Hegel refused to consider an examination of the limits of reason a separate task that should precede any questions about morality, but rather saw the two as being carried out in conjunction. To say that we know only appearances is to say that we know nothing. And there is no need to suspend metaphysics until we have fully answered the question �How are synthetic a priori cognitions possible?�. �Many of our modern essays in philosophy are mere repetitions of the old metaphysical method, an endless and uncritical thinking in a groove determined by the natural bent of each man�s mind�.

Hegel saw Kant as a precursor to his own philosophy, tracing a path through the historicised pattern of ideas to the apprehension of reality itself through the dialectic. Kant is an advance from the pre-Kantian metaphysicians Hegel terms, �dogmatists�. Their na� attempts to grasp reality were based on insufficient scepticism about their intellectual equipment, discussing the Soul, the World and God without questioning the sharp delineations of the finite and infinite that they employed. With Kant�s metaphysics of the understanding came consideration about the validity of the Dogmatists� �title to fixity and truth�, and ultimately ushered in the Hegelian speculative truth which holds opposing fomulae �in union as a totality�. Hegel commends Kant in terms which appear in direct contrast to Kant�s stated aims of combating scepticism and accepting certain forms of thinking uncritically.

discuss Kant�s ignoring reason

Walsh ends rather remarkably by concluding that the differences between Kant and Hegel lie largely in details, although admittedly of considerable importance. For instance, Kant�s system of the categories is permanent, whereas Hegel�s is apparently richer and subject to change. But overall, though Kant lacked the imagination that Hegel applied boldly to his system, Kant might well have written Hegel�s philosophy, other than the �nonsense� that Hegel occasionally lapses into.

Reading � Guyer, �Thought and being: Hegel�s critique of Kant�s theoretical philosophy� in Beiser (ed), chapter 6

see �reading � Hegel, Cambridge companion�

Kant�s indispensable contribution to the progress of philosophy was in recognising that the most basic principles of human thought reflect the structure of our own minds. The final step consisted in realising the identity between the nature of reality and human thought.

Kant saw that we could not have both necessary and empirical knowledge, that we could either know what is necessary a priori, or learn contingent and particular truths through experience. His acceptance of this impassable gulf was based on Hume.

Hegel and Kant have very different sensibilities, and Guyere wonders whether they are even addressing the same issues.

Hegel offers no explanation of how to justify necessary truth without controverting Kant�s analysis of the limitations of the intellect. Guyere accuses him of trying to avail himself of the Kantian claims to a priori knowledge in order to apply them beyond the scope of human representation to which Kant saw they are limited.

Hegel may be correct in his basic point that the necessary truths Kant holds up may well themselves be radically contingent. While Kant goes some way towards recognising this as an inherent limitation of human cognition, Hegel sees it as a sign that Kant�s philosophy will ultimately become a superceded period in the history of philosophy.

Notes from last tutorial

Hegel poses problems for Kant

criticises received view of (mental reality) makes you think hard about experience

empiricist: experience = clumping of mental items called ideas, �physics of psyche�, e.g. Hume, associationist

Kant: dualistic: intuitions vs concepts (which organise other representations), particular vs universal, rules

apply concepts to sensible givens

Hegel: problem with Kantian dualism

how do we ever know that the concepts are appropriate to intuition

areas not covered: self-consciousness, human action

Vorstellung � representation (German for �idea�)

Hegel does genuinely try to historicise philosophy

Kant does not historicise philosophy � you are rejecting everything before + after with each philosophy

Nietzsche � there is no truth once and for all

philosophy = personal confession, also historical

attempt at objectivity is misguided

Hegel � why is philosphy historical???

there is a timeless truth, but it is not timelessly accessible

develops in a temporal way towards timeless destiny through history

Quotes

��Altogether � especially in his refutations � Kant showed a pervasive ignorance of philosophical systems and a lack of any information about them that went beyond purely historical data� (FK 85).

Discarded

area of contention:

dualities: thought + being, reality + ideality, sensuous and supersensuous, infinity + finitude

idealism???

Points

Ultimately, Hegel�s discontent with Kant boils down to what he failed to do. By relying on the understanding without employing speculative reason, Kant made progress but did not discover the Hegelian system. In this sense, Hegel sees Kant as being a forerunner that stopped short, defining Kant in terms of the Hegelian rather than the other way round. Kant was forever trapped in his own unsynthesised opposites, perhaps most importantly in terms of the phenomenal-noumenal and a non-metaphysical world of appearances.

Hegel would certainly regard a large proportion of his philosophy as resting on, and therefore a critique of, Kant. But there are also other influences who should not be forgotten, notably his contemporaries Fichte and Schelling.

But an enormous amount of Hegel�s thinking can be described as a reaction to Kant. However, Walsh�s conclusion that Kant might have been a Hegelian if he had had a little more imagination seems farfetched. Hegel�s critique of Kant does him so much violence that though Kant�s influence is enormous, their two philosophies are quite divergent.

Hegel never judges Kant on his own terms. He shies away from criticising Kant internally on the basis of unsound arguments, nor does he examine Kant�s own reasons for his subjectivism, but sees it almost as �a failure of nerve� (Guyer). We can understand why this is, since Hegel regards his system as the culmination of the history of philosophy to which Kant provides only the denouement. Kant�s philosophy is good in as much as it agrees with Hegel�s own, can be assimilated into it or provides one half of a thesis-antithesis pair. Methodologically, Hegel�s dependence on dialectic places him at odds with most Kantian conclusions, since Hegel finds an antithesis and synthesis in response to almost everything. Hegel pounces on anything in Kant which might be interpreted as dialectical as an anticipation of the future.

is Hegel so different that Kant is merely an influence, or is Hegel an outgrowth of Kant???

Glossary

Hegel

Geist

Geist is conscious as all human subjectivity. Geist is infinite in the all-pervading sense of the synthesis of infinity and finitude.

Geist as rational structure trying to know itself is like the idea of a material and complex human brain trying to understand itself

Absolute middle

�The concept of the �middle� of two antithetical concepts allows each to be thought as an aspect of a larger whole, or relationship, of which they are opposite poles�

Dialectic (as applied to the empirical manifold and the unity of understanding)

�Both makes the other possible and each �determines� the other: that is, each in very different ways makes the other what it is� (Priest)

God

God is �defined as absolute Spirit� (LL 82), the concept of the whole or the truly infinite. God provides the exception to the rule that �anything we only think or conceive is not on that account actual� (LL 84). This is saying that by thinking about God, �the unity of thought and reality/being�, it must be??? It requires extra premises from Absolute Idealism to make what is, spiritual. Kant is only mentioned as attacking the ontological argument in CoPR, which is defended.

Kant

Judgement

�Judgement� is the faculty of thinking the �particular as contained under the universal� (CJ 18).

Empirical manifold

Kant�s manifold of experience

Absolute abstract unity

Kant�s understanding (Verstand) considered in abstraction from but as a condition for experience

Reflecting vs determinant judgement

in determinant judgement the particular x is judged to be From by subsumption under some universal �F�. But in reflecting judgement �the particular is given� but �the universal has to be found for it� (CJ 18), entailing that determinant judgement is in a sense tied down but reflecting judgement is free. reflecting judgement is a kind of choosing, of how to find nature intelligible, which in this sense exists as a result of a synthesis of freedom and nature.

Regulative but not constitutive employment (the ideas of reason)

�they properly describe our cogntive ambitions as well as presuppositions, but cannot be taken by themselves to furnish absolute knowledge of metaphysical reality� (Guyer) (A 642-704/B 670-732)

Questions

metaphysics vs ontology

Does Hegel reject the Ansich, or say that the world of appearances is the only world???

no, he says that we can know about reality through reason and the dialectic.

�Reason for Hegel is constitutive not regulative�???

absolute middle???

intuitive???

Concept vs Idea??? vs Notion???

in Taylor�s Hegel, he sees the Enlightenment as reacting to the medieval view that the world could be understood interpretively (e.g. the Seven Metals), yet Hegel seems to be talking about a rational (rather than vitalistic) materialism???

could Hegel�s pantheism be reinterpreted as panpsychism???

what does it mean to talk of the unity of the universal and the particular???

would Kant have thought Hegel to be a joker???

categories??? where do they get their objectivity??? are they concepts???

synthetic a priori??? transcendental aesthetic/idealism???

Antinomies

what�s the difference between God and Geist???

is Kant saying that space and time are a priori in the sense that our consciousness is also itself subject to them (cf Jaynes, mind-space) or what??? Jaynes rests his claim on the fact that consciousness is based on a sort of internal model of ourself acting in the world though �

phenom/nuomena vs intuitions/concepts